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ethical relativism

Rationality, Culture, and
the Construction of
“Ethical Discourse”:
A Comparative Perspective*
CAROLYN POPE EDWARDS
The problem of ethical relativism has never been resolved or laid to
rest. It turns out to be a complicated set of problems, involving many
philosophical issues of meaning (Brandt 1954; Ladd 1957). For example, how should we deﬁne morality and ethics? How should we
deﬁne the problem of ethical relativism? How does the problem of
ethical relativism relate to the problem of cultural relativism?
One question that is part of this package is a scientiﬁc one and
concerns whether there are even aspects of moral values and ethical
discourse that can be validly abstracted from their cultural context
and compared cross-culturally. This is the problem of “descriptive
ethical relativism” (Ladd 1957; Spiro 1984). Obviously, if there are
no such aspects, then we have good reason to embrace an extreme
doctrine of descriptive ethical relativism. On the other hand, if scientiﬁc research indicates that there are comparable aspects, then we can
go on to ask a second, primarily philosophical question.
CAROLYN POPE EDWARDS is Assistant Professor of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst [1985].
* This paper was published in Ethos: The Journal of Psychological Anthropology, 13
(1985), pp. 318-339. © 1985 American Anthropological Association. Used by permission. Authorization to copy this content beyond fair use (as speciﬁed in Sections
107 and 108 of the U. S. Copyright Law) for internal or personal use, or the internal
or personal use of speciﬁc clients, is granted by the American Anthropological Association for libraries and other users, provided that they are registered with and pay
the speciﬁed fee via Rightslink® on AnthroSource (http://www.anthrosource.net)]
or directly with the Copyright Clearance Center, http://www.copyright.com.
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The second question (Ladd and Spiro call it the issue of “normative ethical relativism”) concerns whether the ethical conﬂicts of individuals or cultural groups are somehow resolvable. They might be
resolvable if ethical conﬂicts can somehow be reduced to mere diﬀerences in underlying factual beliefs (about nature, human personality,
and so on). They might not be resolvable if ethical conﬂicts turn out
to be based on diﬀerences in moral principles, even after the diﬀerences in factual beliefs are accounted for.
This paper shall address the ﬁrst question, because I feel it is the
one social scientists (as opposed to moral philosophers) are most
qualiﬁed to answer. The question, as I see it, involves an analysis of
research methodology. How can social scientists elicit samples of people’s ethical discourse? Do these samples of discourse validly represent the individual’s or group’s moral and ethical understanding? Can
these samples be compared in some systematic way cross-culturally
without distortion of their basic meaning?
“Ethical discourse” can be deﬁned as a string of statements or arguments containing “moral statements” (statements about what actions or attitudes are obligatory or virtuous) and/or “ethical statements” (statements about why those actions or attitudes are morally right or wrong). Ladd, who studied the ethical discourse of the
Navaho (1957), believes that ethical discourse occurs in all cultural
groups.
TWO CONTRASTING APPROACHES
A subdiscipline within psychology, variously known as the “cognitive-developmental,” “cognitive-structuralist,” or simply “Piagetian”
school, shares with anthropology a central interest in the formal or
structured aspects of human ethical discourse. However, in spite of
their common interest, the two traditions have remained unintegrated, with little cross-fertilization of ideas, because they are characterized by opposing assumptions. I shall try to argue, though, that steps
toward integration would have much to oﬀer both sides, in terms of
wrestling with the bear of ethical relativism.
In earlier papers I have tried to persuade psychologists of the
merits of the anthropological perspective (Edwards 1978, 1979,
1982, 1985b; Harkness, Edwards, and Super 1981). This paper goes
the other way and suggests that anthropologists interested in the
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study of values might well take a new look at the cognitive-developmental research. In particular, they might view its methodology as an
additional useful way of eliciting information about the range and
complexity of ethical beliefs held by people within a cultural community.
The underlying assumption that has created a chasm between the
two traditions concerns not whether ethical discourse is structured or
organized (both sides agree on that) but rather the nature and source
of the structure (Shweder 1982). Anthropologists typically view ethical discourse as a cultural product, culturally constructed and transmitted from adults to children. These scientists therefore tend to be
“descriptive relativists.” That is, they tend to believe that each individual’s moral and ethical ideas are relative to the cultural group in
which he or she lives and determined in large part by contextual or
experiential conditions. Furthermore, insofar as they also believe that
every culture’s ethical system must be treated as a unique whole, they
may additionally assert a second thesis of “descriptive relativism,”
namely, that there is an irreducible diversity of moral standards—an incommensurability across cultural boundaries.
In contrast, the cognitive-developmental psychologists take a different view of the source of structure in ethical discourse. Without
denying that a large part of any moral code is culturally transmitted,
they assert that rational considerations also play a major role in the determination of the structure of ethical discourse. After all, they argue,
the speakers of ethical discourse are people, thinking people, and the
structure of people’s knowledge in all domains—ethics included—
involves the cognitive control and manipulation of concrete or abstract concepts, categories, or skills (Colby et al. 1983; Fischer 1980;
Kohlberg 1983; Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983; Turiel 1983). It
is the logical structure of knowledge (in particular, its level of complexity) that is commensurable cross-culturally.
Thus, these psychologists assert, constraints set by the very nature
of human cognition limit the number of basic ways in which people
in any culture can judge, choose, validate or justify moral prescriptions as a part of ethical discourse. There may be an unlimited diversity of ethical systems but not of logical-types of ethical arguments.
If this thesis is correct, then we have good reason to reject an extreme doctrine of descriptive ethical relativism. At least one part of
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everyone’s ethical system is determined not by his or her cultural experience but rather by cognitive reasoning processes.
Some anthropologists are forceful advocates of just such a proposal (e.g., Spiro 1984). However, most anthropologists would probably disagree with a further proposal of that group of psychologists,
namely, that the set of logical-types of ethical argument and justiﬁcation are tied to an invariant, universal, developmental sequence.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1981, 1983; Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983), for instance, has proposed a six-stage sequence of moral
judging involving an increasingly abstract, articulated, and explicit
understanding of morality. The ethical discourse that is graded in
terms of the stages is elicited by a dilemma interview method. Informants are told short hypothetical problem-stories and asked to
explain both what a person should do and why. A description of the
stages, in terms of their structures for deciding “what is right,” “reasons for doing right,” and the “social perspective” underlying decision making, is presented in Table 1. (The table is taken from Kohlberg 1983: 174-176.)
Within any cultural community, Kohlberg claims, individual differences are seen in ethical discourse that are tied to age and personal
development (that is, to level of cognitive maturation and amount of
“role-taking” experience). Thus, the young children in all cultures are
hypothesized to “sound a lot alike” when they engage in ethical discourse because of their cognitive concreteness (information processing limitations).
Similarly, at the other end of the developmental continuum we
might ﬁnd the moral elders (perhaps those inﬂuential “good talkers,” found in every cultural group, whose opinions are regarded by
the whole community as worthy of respect). These moral elders, or
“moralists” as Ladd (1957) calls them, might be expected to “speak
in a similar voice” in terms of controlling highly abstract systems
of moral judging and ethical reasoning. Under some cultural conditions, these same “moralists” might well be the people most able
to cognitively “step outside” the bounds of local ethical concepts
and generate a critical analysis, a meta-ethical perspective, on reality (Levy 1984).
Is there any reason for anthropologists to take a closer look at
what must surely seem to many of them to be a preposterous pair
of claims? I think there are four reasons to do so, and they relate to

What is Right?

Fulﬁlling duties to which one has
agreed. Laws are to be upheld except
in extreme cases where they conﬂict
with other ﬁxed social duties. Right
also means contributing to society,
the group, or institution.

Living up to what is expected by signiﬁcant others or what is generally expected of people in the role of daughter, brother, friend, and so on. “Being
good” is important and means having
good motives, showing concern about
others. It also means keeping mutual
relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.

Following rules only when it is to
one’s immediate interest; acting to
meet one’s own interests and needs
and letting others do the same. Right
is also what is fair, what is an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.

To avoid breaking rules that are
backed by punishment. Obedience
for its own sake. Avoiding physical
damage to persons and property.

Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they
rest on such principles. When laws
violate these principles, one acts in
accordance with the universal principles of justice: the equality of human
rights and respect for the dignity of
human beings as individual persons.

Stage 6:
Universal ethical principles

The belief as a rational person in the
validity of universal moral principles,
and a sense of personal commitment
to them.

A sense of obligation to law because
of the social contract to make and
abide by laws for the welfare of all
and for the protection of all people’s
rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be
based on rational calculation of overall utility. “The greatest good for the
greatest number.”

To maintain the institution as a
whole; to avoid the breakdown in the
system that would happen “if everyone did it”; or the imperative of conscience to meet one’s deﬁned obligations. (Easily confused with Stage 3
belief in rules and authority.)

The need to be a good person in one’s
own eyes and those of others. Caring for others. Belief in the Golden
Rule. Desire to maintain rules and
authority that support stereotypical
good behavior.

To serve one’s own needs or interests in a world where it is recognized
that other people have their own interests too.

Avoidance of punishment; the superior power of authorities.

Reasons for Doing Right

Perspective of a moral point of view
from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of a rational
individual recognizing the nature of
morality or the fact that persons are
ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

Prior-to-society perspective. Perspective of a rational individual aware of
values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates
perspectives by formal mechanisms
of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers
moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conﬂict and
ﬁnds it diﬃcult to integrate them.

Societal point of view is diﬀerentiated from interpersonal agreement
of motives. Takes the point of view
of the system that deﬁnes roles and
rules. Considers individual relations
in terms of place in the system.

Perspective of the individual in relationship with other individuals.
Aware of shared feelings, agreements,
and expectations that take primacy over individual interests. Relates
points of view through the concrete
Golden Rule, “putting yourself in the
other guy’s shoes.” Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.

Concrete individualistic perspective.
Awareness that each person has interests to pursue, and that these interests
may conﬂict, so that right is relative
(in the concrete individualistic sense).

Egocentric point of view. Does not
consider the interests of others or recognize that they diﬀer from the actor’s; does not relate two points of
view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion
of authority’s perspective with one’s
own.

Social Perspective of Stage
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Source: Kohlberg 1983: 174-1 76.

Being aware that people hold a variety
of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to the group.
However, these rules should usually
be upheld, in the interest of impartiality and because they form the social
contract. Some nonrelative values and
rights such as life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and
regardless of majority opinion.

Stage 5:
Social contract
or utility and
individual rights

Level III: Postconventional or Principled

Stage 4: Social system
and conscience

Level II: Conventional
Stage 3:
Mutual interpersonal
expectations,
relationships,
and interpersonal conformity

Stage 2:
Individualism,
instrumental purpose,
and exchange

Level I: Preconventional
Stage 1:
Heteronomous
morality

Level and Stage

T ABLE 1
T HE S IX M ORAL J UDGEMENT S TAGES
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recent revisions or reconsiderations going on within the cognitivedevelopmental school.
THE DILEMMA INTERVIEW METHOD
The purpose of using moral dilemmas to elicit ethical discourse is
that they confront people with two genuine goods, two felt values,
to choose between. The choosing process is diﬃcult, therefore, and
a deliberative or reﬂective judging process tends to move into consciousness and become accessible to the interviewer. Obviously, the
validity of the whole approach depends upon the dilemma interview
method being a fair way in which to tap moral standards and ethical reasoning.
Richard Shweder (1982; Shweder, Turiel, and Much 1981) has
criticized the dilemma method for its basis in “reﬂective reasoning”
(requiring an ability to articulate what is thought); he prefers to investigate “tacit knowledge” (implicit in people’s practice and action
choices). While I agree with Shweder that “tacit knowledge” is extremely important to study, nevertheless my own ﬁeld experience
in Kenya (Edwards 1974) has convinced me that the “reﬂective”
reasoning process is not simply a Western cultural process, nor one
dependent on formal education. Quite the contrary, persons of all
ages, ethnic groups, and walks of life in Kenya seemed aroused, interested, and motivated to talk about moral dilemmas. Tacit knowledge and reﬂective knowledge seem to be two ends of the continuum of moral and ethical knowledge in at least many if not all cultural groups.
One dilemma in particular aroused genuine interest during my
ﬁeldwork and caused people to make comments like, “That’s a very
hard question. Let me think a minute.” This dilemma was developed
expressly for the Kenyan setting (I am indebted to John Whiting
for it), and is presented in Table 2. The dilemma pits two sets of valued status obligations against each other (those a man incurs as “son”
and “brother” versus those he incurs as “husband and father”). While
quite diﬀerent from the older Kohlberg dilemmas, this new problem
proved quite easy to use and score.
How well does the interview method work with respect to crosscultural research? By now there has accumulated a large body of
studies involving the use of Kohlberg’s moral dilemma interview
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T ABLE 2
Hypothetical Moral Dilemma
Daniel and the School Fees
A man, Daniel, managed to complete his secondary school education (Form 4)
on the basis of school fees given him by his brother. Afterwards he married and took
his wife to live with his parents in the rural area, while he got a job in the city. Eight
years later, when his ﬁrst son was ready to go to primary school, his mother and father came to him and said, “Your brother who educated you has been in an accident
and cannot work, so you must now begin to pay for the education of your brother’s
child.” This child was the same age as his own son. The man, Daniel, did not have
enough money to pay school fees for both his own son and his brother’s child. His
wife said he must put his own son ﬁrst.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

What should Daniel do in this situation? Should he put his son or his
brother’s child ﬁrst? Why?
What obligation does he have to his brother who educated him?
What does he owe his son?
Should he obey his parents in this case? Do you think a grown son has to
obey all of his parents’ wishes? Why, or why not?
What should a grown son do for his parents?
Is it more important to maintain harmonious relations with his wife or
with his brother and parents? Why?
Would you condemn Daniel if he just moved his wife and children to the
city and did not pay for the education of his nephew? Why?
Would you yourself expect your eldest children to help their younger
brothers and sisters with school fees? Why, or why not?

method. Some 45 studies of moral development have been carried
out in 27 countries (Snarey 1985). The quality of research has improved steadily over time. Recent reports are typically based on much
more solid and extensive ethnographic understanding, a closer attention to translation issues, and more creative attempts to adapt the
moral dilemma methodology to indigenous concerns than was typical of the early research.
For example, Benjamin Lee (1973, 1976) investigated Taiwanese
philosophy and culture and concluded that a debate had gone on
for centuries in China concerning the “ﬁliality” of certain types of
actions. One particular type of problematical actions are those that
might be beneﬁcial to one’s parents or ancestors but morally wrong
in terms of another major value. Lee constructed four dilemmas centered on ﬁliality. One problem-situation, for instance, concerned
whether a “ﬁlial son” should testify in court against his father if his
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father is a spy for the communists. Lee found that his ﬁliality problems worked well to elicit reﬂective ethical discourse by people of different ages and educational backgrounds in Taiwan.
More recently, Ann Tietjan and Lawrence Walker (in press) have
reported research in Papua New Guinea for which they constructed
a moral dilemma based on an actual village event. This dilemma involves a man who has to decide whether to break the ban placed on
ﬁshing in the sea by the elders of his village. The ban is the customary taboo following the death of a community member, but the man’s
problem arises because there is a food shortage and his family is hungry. Tietjen and Walker used their new dilemma along with adaptations of four of the standard Kohlberg dilemmas.
In sum, while a great deal more in the way of improvements is still
needed, nevertheless, the research does suggest that a moral dilemma
method can work in many cultural settings to elicit or tap a rich vein
of informants’ ethical discourse.
A productive approach for future researchers might be to draw
heavily upon local proverbs and myths as a source of “problem situations.” For example, in Kenya I found that many people from a diversity of ethnic groups produced a proverb as part of their response
to the School Fees dilemma. Here are some examples of comments
made by informants:
This is the same as what we say, “Before you remove the speck from somebody’s
eye, you have to remove the speck in your own eye.” [Meru man, age 28]
Kikuyus say that, “You start with yours before you jump into another’s,” and Europeans say, “I ﬁrst, you second.” [Kikuyu man, age 65]
It is said that when the ﬁre sparks on you and another, you have to remove it oﬀ
yourself ﬁrst. [Kipsigis woman, age 40]
It is said that if the ﬁre sparks jump on you when you are holding the baby, you
have to remove yours ﬁrst, even though the baby is yours. [Kipsigis man, age 75]

It seems that this family of related proverbs codiﬁes or distills ethical wisdom for the African groups of Kenya. Each proverb both
presents a problem (“a burning spark lands on you and a baby”) and
an answer as to what one should do (“brush it oﬀ yourself ﬁrst, then
take care of the baby”). Given that the proverb implicitly involves a
moral problem, why not focus on this problem and try to elicit ethical discourse about its meaning: why should one ﬁrst help himself,
then the baby?

ethical relativism
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THE STANDARD SCORING SYSTEM
Not only the dilemma method but also the scoring system is under
renewed examination in the light of evidence gathered in non-Western communities. At present the dilemma interview method may actually be more culturally elastic than the scoring system. However—
and here is where the help of anthropologists is necessary—the same
methods that have been used to reﬁne the current scoring manual
could also be used to truly open it to the panorama of ethical systems
found worldwide.
The intention of the scoring system is to describe (give criteria
for recognizing) the various forms that moral/ethical arguments may
take and still embody the same basic logical structure. The scoring
system has undergone a great deal of modiﬁcation in recent years as
Kohlberg and colleagues attempt to establish a valid, reliable, standardized, readily learnable methodology. They have settled upon a
method called Standard Scoring (Colby et al. in press) that seems to
meet most of the objections of the American psychological community to earlier versions of the scoring system (see Colby et al. 1983).
How well does the Standard Scoring System work for data collected in non-Western communities? John Snarey, who has studied
ethical discourse in Israel (1985), has begun to treat in a systematic way the cross-cultural interview materials that past researchers
have described as diﬃcult to score. The focus is not on statements that
are unscorable because they are incomplete or inadequately probed.
Rather, the focus is on statements that are complete but do not ﬁt the
stage deﬁnitions and criteria in the Kohlberg scoring manual.
Snarey concludes that the Kohlberg scoring system is sometimes
inadequate for adult specimens of ethical discourse. Some specimens
are complete but seem ambiguous as to whether they should properly be assigned a score of stage 4 or 5, or stage 3 or 4. (The ambiguity does not seem to extend down to stages 1 and 2, which seem
easy to recognize in every cultural sample tested so far.) These problems have arisen most frequently when statements include arguments for “what is right” or “reasons for doing right” that resemble the criterion-judgments for a certain stage, but seem to derive
from a “social perspective” expected at the next higher adjacent
stage. For example, Snarey, Reimer, and Kohlberg (1985) found that
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some Israeli kibbutz subjects used collectivist/communa1 arguments
that were initially “guess-scored” at Stage 4 but eventually understood as full postconventional Stage 5.
Thus, at present the scoring system may misinterpret or underestimate the abstract complexity of some sophisticated arguments in
non-Western cultural groups. Are these problems correctable? Yes,
I would argue that they are, in principle. Since the entire system of
stage deﬁnitions and scoring criteria has been inductively derived,
there is no reason why in principle the system could not be further
revised and expanded in the light of new data. Certainly this endeavor would receive an immeasurable boost from the participation
of anthropologists. To expand the deﬁnitions and prototypes in the
scoring manual, what is required is an extensive body of well-elaborated ethical discourse with which to work, accompanied by linguistic and ethnographic background knowledge to provide the context
for correct interpretation of the speakers’ meanings.
Many anthropologists who have examined Kohlberg’s theory have
been disturbed by the deﬁnition of stages 5 and 6 in terms of a universalistic morality of justice. Kohlberg has explicitly stated that his
theory is a “rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning” (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983: 10). As justiﬁcation he
has reinvoked the Socratic claim that “virtue is not many but one and
its name is justice” (1983: 18).
In contrast to Kohlberg, other cognitivists have argued that there
is no necessity to limit the theory to justice reasoning. Kohlberg himself, in coming to terms with the criticisms of Carol Gilligan (1982),
has recognized that the “dilemmas and scoring system were limited
in the sense that they did not deal with dilemmas (or orientations to
those dilemmas) of special relationships and obligations. Special relationships include relations to family, friends, and to groups of which
the self is a member” (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983:20).
It seems a reasonable hypothesis that the understanding of particularistic, status obligations by people in non-Western societies
may be far more sophisticated than is typical in our society (Shweder and Bourne 1984). Therefore, special attention of future researchers should be focused upon the development of moralities of status obligations, especially those related to kinship roles. This will
require new dilemmas that involve problems of conﬂicting role
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obligations, or problems in which disputants seem to have conﬂicting
expectations about a role (as in Lee’s “ﬁliality” problems). A comparative science of ethical development must come to terms with ways
in which people understand what is right about their culturally deﬁned status obligations.
THE THEORETICAL DEFINITION OF THE
HIGHER STAGES
A third reason to take a new look at the cognitive-developmental
perspective has to do with debate surrounding the theory, in particular the theoretical status of the upper stages. The upper stages have
always been the controversial ones in Kohlberg’s system because they
are not equally distributed across cultural groups tested, nor even
across socioeconomic classes within the Western industrialized societies (Edwards 1975).
You may be interested to know, therefore, that Kohlberg’s close
colleague and “sympathetic critic,” John Gibbs, has recently argued
that the upper stages are not actually true, “hard” develop-mental
stages in the Piagetian sense. Rather, Gibbs (1977, 1979) asserts that
the two upper stages (5 and 6) are “metaethical” reﬂections on morality—”soft stages”—tied more to education and cultural background
than to cognitive maturation and role-taking experience. Gibbs suggests that the four “developmental stages” should be divided into two
major levels: “immature morality” (stages 1 and 2) versus “mature
morality” (stages 3 and 4) (also see the related arguments by German
psychologist Lutz Eckensberger 1981).
Kohlberg himself (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983) now recognizes that development beyond a certain point (stage 5, he would
argue) is best considered a matter of “soft stages.”
This kind of theoretical revision should have the eﬀect of moving
the ﬁrst four stages into center stage. These stages have actually been
rather solidly established as a developmental sequence in a wide variety of cultural settings.
Indeed, should the anthropologically minded reader turn his or
her attention to the research conducted in non-Western communities, that reader will discover that the ﬁrst three to four stages of
Kohlberg’s system apparently capture something about the quality
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and development of ethical discourse that is not culturally speciﬁc.
(Is this the rationality element? Very likely.)
What is the basis of this conclusion? One argument derives from
two sets of research ﬁndings that have compared the ethical discourse of indigenously deﬁned “community leaders” versus “nonleaders.” Harkness, Edwards, and Super (1981) studied 12 men in the rural Kipsigis village of Kokwet in Western Kenya. Half of the men had
local reputations as the “most honest men,” and were often called in
to help resolve disputes, while the other half were comparably Christian, wealthy, and educated but not known for their “honesty.” Tietjen
and Walker (in press) studied 22 men living in the Maisin coastal
villages of Uiaku and Ganjiga, in Oro Province, Papua New Guinea.
The men were divided into four groups: traditional leaders, government leaders, religious leaders, and nonleaders.
Both studies report that the community-deﬁned “moral leaders”
showed more “mature” (stage 3) moral reasoning than did the comparison group of nonleaders (who showed signiﬁcantly more stage
2). The leaders’ ethical discourse, as elicited by the dilemma interview,
was more systematic, and involved a societal rather than merely dyadic
role-taking perspective on issues of right and wrong.
This point can perhaps best be made through illustration. Below
are presented the answers of the Kipsigis men (interviewed by anthropologist Sara Harkness) to a question in one of the dilemmas
concerning whether or not it was bad for a father to break a promise
to his son. The answers of all 12 sample men are presented, to give
readers unfamiliar with moral-dilemma interviewing a sense of the
rich yield that the method provides.
The leaders’ answers are not only longer and more carefully argued than the nonleaders’. Their answers also include more focus on
the father’s possible motivations for breaking his word, the potential
psychological eﬀects on the son, and/or the evolving nature of the
father/son relationship. Further, the leaders attempt to address the
question not as a speciﬁc instance only but rather as an example of a
general case.

ethical relativism

has worked and he has got the money and the father comes and breaks the
promise. Yet he is the one who promised the son [Age 29, 7 years school].
2.

It was bad because the father had earlier on promised his son that he can buy
his record player. The father should leave the money for the child and look for
his own money for repairing his radio [Age 50, 4 years school].

3.

It is not so bad because what could he have done? For when all things are arranged as you want them to be, they can be altered to another way. You may
say, “I am going to do something or such and such,” but a time may come when
you’ll change your mind and say, “It is better for me to do that one ﬁrst, rather
than the one I had intended to do.” But that’s not really changing your mind
[Age 31, 8 years school].

4.

He was supposed to give back the money to James because he had asked James
to help him with money for repairing his radio. He was not to spend it without
giving it back to James, since he had promised James that he can buy his own
record player. It is bad to break what you said, and so nobody wants to break a
promise [Age 47, no school].

5.

In that case maybe the father had an idea that he was going to look for this
money to repay his son [Age 55, no school].

6.

It is bad for the father since he has made the promise. Breaking a promise is
very bad and it applies to everyone. It is also bad if the father is not in good relationship with his son [Age 55, no school].

Answers of the Six “Moral Leaders” in Kokwet
1.

Once we have made a promise and none of us breaks it, then there is going to be
respect and happiness between us. No one will be angry. Therefore, by showing
respect to one another the friendship is assured, and as a result this will uplift
our prosperity in the family. My son can take my advice. It is very bad to promise your child something and then you break the promise. If no truth prevails
between you and your son, then you will not feel happy, since you will not be
in unity. But if it is something you agree with one another, then it is not bad. If
the child doesn’t listen to you, then you ﬁnd that maybe there is not a good relationship between the father and son [Age 55, no school].

2.

It is better to say the truth because it is something like—we say it in our proverb, “It is better to say the truth or to say something kind to somebody else.” It
is something like obedience. If you don’t keep the promise you will be wrong.
You will lose your friend by saying lies—a liar. It is wrong to break a promise
because, say, I promise a friend of mine that I will meet him somewhere and
then I fail to go there. Let us say he waits today and tomorrow. The third day
there is no friendship at all—no connection. So that James will be disobedient
to his father if the father breaks a promise [Age 40, 8 years school].

3.

Considering it in the ﬁrst instance, the father took the money peacefully and
not by force. Things taken from him by force is bad, but if it was agreed between

Answers of Six “Non-Leaders” in Kokwet
1.

It is bad because the father is the one who promised the son, “You work and
when you get money, you can buy your own record player.” But now the child
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them it is good, that is, the father tells the son, “My child, now the money you
intended to buy a record player with, let us use it for the other purpose, and next
time you buy it.” For the son and the father to agree upon one thing is good, because [otherwise] they will struggle without peace until they buy the intended
player [Age 55, no school].

4.

The father is asking for the money, telling James, “Because you haven’t bought
your record player yet, give me a hand in repairing my radio.” But if James had
already bought his record player, then there would be nothing that the father
could say. Nothing could be done [Age 50, no school].

5.

It is not bad because you are trying to mix your blood with that of your child.
The ﬁrst word to come out of his mouth is that he wants to go dancing to please
himself. Then you tell him, “Work now until you get money.” Now, how will you
know that he is going to give you this money? What will you do, for example,
when you have no food to eat or clothes to wear? How will you know [that he
is being honest with you]? I, for one, as soon as my son gets money, I tell him,
“Leave that, instead buy for me this ox for ploughing.” You will not think that
the child has been denied his money, but that he is checked to save his heart
to see whether his heart is straight. But if his heart is astray, then he will say, “I
want to buy a player.” Thereby you are not in good coordination with him. So
it is not bad [to ask him for his money]; but for the next time, he should be allowed to do his own work himself [keep his money for his own purpose] since
he is a good child [Age 75, no school].

6.

The father has the right to direct his children on what to do because he is the
one who cares for them. [Yet] as I said earlier, the child might know that his
father has got some money but seeks that of this child. The child might think,
“Why should he take my money and yet he has got his?” That occurs when there
is no unity, or there is misunderstanding between them at home. . . . The son
might say, “I wish to buy a bicycle”. . . . But when parents tell the son, “There
is no money to buy for you a bicycle,” the child might struggle to progress and
is determined to buy a bicycle. If you now come and ask him to give you the
money while he is still progressing, then it will not be easy for him to give you,
especially when the son knows that the father clearly understands that the son
has never been squandering his money. And so he will not be happy to give the
money to his father. He will say, “How can I surrender to him some of my money and yet I want to buy a bicycle? Father has got some money and as such I am
unable to give him mine.” And therefore in such cases, the father doesn’t have a
right to make such unfair demands [Age 32, 6 years school].

In sum, in a basic way that has to do with formal characteristics
of their ethical discourse, the moral leaders in study communities
in Kenya and New Guinea-communities widely separated in time,
space, and cultural tradition-sounded like each other, and the nonleaders similarly sounded like each other. Their individual samples of
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ethical discourse were commensurate, to adapt Alan Page Fiske’s
(1984) phraseology.
CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN EARLY
MORAL CONCEPTS
A fourth and ﬁnal reason for anthropologists to take a second look
at recent cognitive-developmental research has to do with the debate raging within the discipline concerning the emergence of moral
concepts in very young children. One group of cognitive-psychologists has actually deﬁned for themselves a position much further out
on the “rational self-construction” continuum than has the Kohlberg
group.
Eliot Turiel (1983) of Berkeley and his colleagues, Larry Nucci
(1982) and Judith Smetana (1983), claim that not only the structure
but also the content of basic morality is rationally self-constructed.
This content, they claim, centers on issues of justice and harm and
arises out of young children’s predisposition to engage in social roletaking. Children empathize with people in distress (Hoﬀman 1975)
and consider such questions as, “What if this were to happen to me?”
These experiences persuade them of the immorality of actions that
harm others or violate their rights.
This self-construction process, they claim, can be indirectly observed by studying children’s naturally occurring “transgression” situations. Their studies, conducted in U.S. settings (mostly classrooms)
suggest that when justice/harm rules are violated, two consequences
usually take place. First, victims provide “distress” or “outrage” feedback, and second, if and when adults intervene, they do so in a way
that provides children with additional concrete information about
“what is intrinsically wrong” with harming another or violating his
rights. The consequences of moral transgressions, the researchers
conclude, diﬀer in critical respects from the consequences of transgressions that involve nonmoral rules such as table manners and other matters of etiquette (also see Much and Shweder 1978).
These brave people may have gotten themselves out on the end
of a long limb that is about to break (see Edwards 1985a, in press;
Shweder 1982). Struck by the power of even young children as active, “rational” constructers of rule-related knowledge, they have
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underestimated the role of adults in “scaﬀolding” the knowledgeconstruction process and “orienting” children to the culturally deﬁned meanings embedded in interpersonal interaction.
In recent papers I have critiqued certain aspects of the Turiel-Nucci-Smetana position, based on an empirical analysis of the social interactions of Kenyan Luo children aged 2 to 12 years. The data come
from the corpus of naturalistic observations collected by anthropologist Carol Ember (see Ember 1973; Bookman and Ember in press).
Ember trained her observers (educated students from the local
area) to record the children’s speech to one another as exactly as possible. A reexamination of her observational protocols reveals much
about the conversational routines of the children. In particular, the
observations are rich in interpersonal “ethical discourse-in-action”
that takes place when parents correct or sanction children or when
children command one another, correct one another’s misdemeanors,
and negotiate about family responsibilities.
The reanalysis of Ember’s observations suggests that Oyugis
adults (and children) diﬀer from their U.S. counterparts in two
ways. First, they seem to include in the moral domain certain kinds
of rules that Americans consider simply conventional, or nonmoral.
In particular, they treat as moral matters the rules of etiquette and
proper social presentation, and also the status obligations related
to age and sex roles. This cultural diﬀerence suggests that children
everywhere construct notions about what is “morally desirable or
obligatory” (versus desirable for some other reason) not simply by
exercising their own rational powers. Rather, they must look to cultural cues, to distinctions implicitly conveyed to children by means
of powerful suggestions and corrections (D’Andrade 1981; Shweder 1982).
Second, the Oyugis observations present a contrast to the American materials in the typical patterns of adult and child response to
transgression. This suggests that cultural communities may diﬀer
sharply in the way that they communicate information to children
about the “reasons for doing right.” For example, adults may organize their responses to children’s transgressions in ways that focus
attention upon one or more of the following aspects: the rationale
underlying the rule; the sanctions attached to rule violation; the affect motivating obedience (empathy, guilt, shame, and so on). Ration-
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ales are highlighted by use of “inductive” disciplinary techniques that
involve discussion of why an action is wrong. Sanctions are highlighted by use of “power-assertive” techniques, such as physical punishment and frightening threats. Aﬀects are highlighted by use of
guilt or shame-producing techniques, such as love withdrawal, ridicule, shaming, and so on (see Edwards in press; B. Whiting 1950; J.
Whiting 1967).
In sum, the Oyugis, Kenyan ﬁndings point to the key role of cultural authority in deﬁning “what is right” and “reasons for doing right.”
Nevertheless, the ﬁndings by no means suggest that rational considerations play a negligible role in moral and ethical decision making.
Quite the contrary, the ﬁndings reveal that the Kenyan children resemble the American ones in one major way. In both cultural settings, the children, far from being robotic followers of cultural rules,
seem like “little lawyers” as they negotiate their responsibilities and
persuade one another of the proper or required course of action. Even
children as young as 2 or 3 years of age have begun to engage in ethical discourse. The process of ethical discourse-in-action in the two
cultural settings seems basically more similar than diﬀerent. Here is
an especially vivid observation from Oyugis of children negotiating
moral rights and wrongs. It involves four children aged 5 to 10. One
of them is a visitor to the homestead, while the other three are siblings.
I. (Visitor Girl, age 10) calls O. (Boy, age 8) to come get the baby because he is
crying. O. tries to come but on the way is deliberately blocked by his little brother,
G. (age 5). The visitor girl canes G. to let O. go by.
G. complains wittily to the visitor girl, “Can’t you remember what I’ve done for
you? I brought the baby from the other house for you, and now you’re caning me!”
N. (Sister of G., age 8) oﬀers comfort to G., “If she can’t remember what you did
for her, then never help her anymore.”
I. (Visitor) leaves and withdraws into the house [Observation by Carol Ember,
quoted in Edwards 1985a].

CONCLUSION
What is the signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings discussed in this paper
for the problem of ethical relativism? First, most of the ﬁndings relate to the problem of “descriptive relativism,” that is, whether moral
values and ethical discourse can be “joined” across cultural bound-
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aries—abstracted from their cultural context and validly compared.
While the evidence is far from deﬁnitive, nevertheless the weight of
recent ﬁndings on the psychology of ethical reasoning would seem
to incline against any extreme doctrine of descriptive relativism. Far
from indicating a radical “incommensurability” of ethical beliefs and
ideas, the ﬁndings suggest that human beings from diﬀerent cultural
traditions can quite easily understand one another’s ethical discourse.
It appears that in all cultural communities, the discourse draws from
a common human pool of modes of judging, choosing, justifying, and
validating moral action.
Second, the ﬁndings also have a bearing on the related problem of
“normative relativism,” that is, whether ethical conﬂicts across cultural boundaries can be resolved. Can people from diﬀerent traditions not only understand one another but also reach agreement on
ethical conﬂicts? If, as some have asserted, most or all of morality is
“socially transmitted,” then we would have reason to doubt that any
ethical conﬂicts between cultures could ever be resolved. In contrast,
if some part of the core of morality is rationally constructed, then we
have good reason to suppose that “ethically competent judges” from
diverse cultural traditions might be able to ﬁnd a common meeting
ground and agree, if not on one system of moral principles, then on a
limited universe of acceptable types of moral systems. Again, I conclude that the psychological research evidence inclines against an extreme doctrine of normative relativism. Though cultural groups do
diﬀer in how they order values in their hierarchy and how they deﬁne the parameters in their equations of “justice” (and these diﬀerences are not rationally resolvable), yet their diﬀerences concern only
some, not all, questions (Wong 1984).Much can be agreed upon.
The always thoughtful and often passionate struggle to resolve ethical problems-a process that is culturally shared, not speciﬁc-indicates
that we must not underestimate or ignore the rationally constructed
aspect of morality and ethics.
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